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Abstract 
Ancient scribal culture had two faces. After arduous and largely impractical training, scribes 
were admitted to an elite circle and became custodians of a cultural tradition. But scribal 
teachers were also credited with opening the eyes of their students and ‘forming humanity’ 
in them. Scribal writers created and challenged tradition. Both faces are still evident in 
modern ‘scribal culture’. Nietzsche, who occupies an ambiguous position in this regard, is 
used to illuminate aspects of tension between the two ‘faces’, which, given the world 
situation, seems relevant to the future of the academic enterprise. Finally, it is suggested that 
ancient wisdom still has something to tell us about these matters. The article is dedicated to 
Hendrik Bosman in view of his abiding interest in scribal culture, wisdom literature and יהוה 
ראת 
 
The old Fogies’ Lament 
“Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold.” Even before Yeats provided these words, this 
has been the old fogies’ lament. Recently many who are not old and do not consider 
themselves fogies have joined the chorus. Some of these are academics who had 
previously shown no great attachment to the centre. The margins looked attractive when 
they did not harbour ISIS and the Taliban; post-truth sounded liberating when Donald 
Trump was not its prophet; local petit recits were charming until they revealed themselves as 
smallminded and xenophobic. 
 
One could argue that the current rough beasts were born of the ill-advised liaisons of 
academics. Have we not posted truth to parts unknown long before ‘post-truth’ became 
word of the year for 2016? I first met ‘alternative facts’ as ‘transgressive data’ in an 
academic paper (St Pierre 1996). Academics ‘naturalized’ violence, partly by identifying 
violent elements in all our practices, partly by the violence of their own rhetoric. Having 
theoretically reduced everything to power, they are practically powerless in the face of 
Realpolitiker who do not give a fig for theory. Is it dissimulation when Trump says that 
nobody respects women more than he does or Jacob Zuma that he has done nothing wrong? 
In a world of simulacra and competing perspectives it is hard to say – and harder still to say 
why it matters. (Hint: any distinction would presuppose ‘centred subjects’.) 
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Is Trump Nietzsche come home to roost? Since 2016, ‘Nietzsche – Trump’ articles and blogs 
have proliferated, with noted Nietzsche scholars leaping to his defence.1 Nietzsche has 
been misread; his strident sayings were not intended to be taken literally; he would have 
hated Trump. All true (true?) to be sure, but not unproblematic. Is there a correct way of 
reading, an understanding beyond the play of perspectives? Do authorial intentions 
matter and how are they determined? If Trump is a parody of Nietzsche (Schacht 2016) and 
if they both “revolt against the establishment and against the ruling majority’s ethos” 
(Golomb 2017), we have to provide criteria for saying that “they have nothing in common” 
(Golomb 2017). The ones listed by Golomb (in two columns) are shaky. Perhaps Nietzsche 
stood for (for instance): “spontaneous, direct and impulsive action”; “sensualism and 
acceptance of one’s inclinations”; “the ability to accept contradictions [also from 
yourself]”. Is this not also Trump? “Power for Nietzsche is the name of the game” (Schacht 
2016) – as it is for Trump. 
 
Yet Nietzscheans will not mistake symptoms for causes. Though the purveyors of 
‘theory’ have much to answer for – their stylistic atrocities to start with – they have little 
clout outside universities. If, following Marx, we consider the mode of production before 
the ideological products, it is obvious that academia has long pandered to late capitalism, 
which prizes decentred (dehumanized) subjects (human resources), signifiers without a 
fixed signified ($) and states of flux (laissez faire). ‘Subversive’ theorizing and moralistic 
activism are firmly checked by a managerial system of incentives, outputs, ratings, and the 
like. 
 
“Surely some revelation is at hand.” In such times prophets appear early and late, 
“though I sent them not”, lamentations abound and even the apocalyptic note crops up. 
Academics are probably not the best exponents of these modes. As scribes, heirs to an old 
scribal culture, they are better advised to try their hand at being wisdom teachers. Wisdom, 
a plodder rather than a superhero, has never saved or revolutionized the world. She is 
fragile and limited and, since she seldom appears in modish clothes, not invariably welcome 
at intellectual galas.2 She is apt to say embarrassing things about יהוה יראת and politically 
incorrect ones about fools. But are we not “lovers of wisdom” nonetheless? 
 
In examining the relationship between the ancient scribal wisdom tradition and the 
modern one, I take Nietzsche along – as a shadow, not an adjudicator. Perhaps he did, as he 
thought, stand at the crossroads in Western thought, where our judgements can lead in 
several directions. Only some lead us to Trump and similar figures; only some lead to the 
apotheosis of Nietzsche. But Nietzsche, with all his ambiguities, is bracing company. 
 
The Two Faces of the Scribe 
The picture Carr paints of Mesopotamian scribal training, particularly the initial part, is 
hardly pleasant. It involved much memorizing of standard texts and lists (2005:23-29), 
some in Sumerian when Sumerian had long disappeared as a spoken language, other in an 
antiquated form of Akkadian (30). This “enforced learning of archaic material” with “huge 
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amounts of impractical information” made the scribe “an obedient part of the broader 
community” (32), but also admitted him (rarely her)3 to an elite class (33). Although “the 
most successful scribes” created new texts (32, 36), the majority reproduced or edited 
traditional material (33ff). As Van der Toorn (2007:56) says, “the emphasis lay on 
memorization and scribal skills rather than on the intellectual grasp of the subject matter”. 
 
Arguably Carr underplays the other side to the picture. He quotes the following tribute of a 
student to his teacher: “You have opened my eyes as though I were a puppy; you have 
formed humanity within me” (2005:31). The images of the opening of eyes and of 
becoming human also appear elsewhere. Certainly, young students are inducted into a 
cultural tradition and an elite class, but they also enter a broad world of learning that 
transcends mere snobbery. They become “not merely penmen and copyists but 
intellectuals”, “the academics of their time” (Van der Toorn 2007b:57). The few who pass 
through the advanced part of the curriculum become “scribes in the fullest sense of the 
term: scribes, rs, and sages – the living repositories of the stream of tradition” (Van der 
Toorn 2007b:59). 
 
They become bearers but also creators of tradition. The Gilgamesh Epic, part of the 
ancient curriculum, is still part of the curriculum in many Humanities courses – with good 
reason. Job (in its present form) and Ecclesiastes both bear the stamp of scribal culture,4 
neither simply repeats received wisdom. Did the Dialogue of Pessimism do so? Those 
whose eyes have been opened often see more than their teachers showed them – or wanted 
them to see. 
 
Apparently our scribes (sages?) still wear both these faces. Carr (2005:33) cites historians 
of education who “have long supposed that the highest levels of education are often marked 
by their distance from the practical, isolating a small group of those who can afford 
specialization and irrelevance from the mass of those relegated to ‘vocational’ … training”. 
They still distinguish themselves through “virtuosity in mastering of an arcane writing 
system”. Can this refer to our universities, our ‘engaged academics’? Bearers of a cultural 
tradition, we producers of knowledge, we free spirits? But we have been disciplined into 
our disciplines and need to be aware of current discourses – that is, fashions. Elitists? Not 
unless interlopers venture to express uninformed opinions about the king’s absence of 
clothes. 
 
Initially scribes had a high status simply because theirs was a scarce skill that ensured its 
possessors good careers. In Mesopotamia the ummia, the scribal teacher, was an exalted 
figure, being close to both the kings and the god of wisdom, Enki/Ea.5 As literacy spread, 
not all scribes could attain high posts: further education became necessary.6 The status of 
teachers also fell. In Greece they had no particular standing; in Rome they were sometimes 
slaves (Harris 1989:160). Already in Mesopotamia royals and nobles boasted of their 
scribal skills (Van der Toorn 2007b:54f). No prominent citizen in Greece and Rome wanted 
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to be an agrammatos or illiterates.7 The precious art was in danger of becoming all too 
common. 
 
As Van der Toorn (2007a; 2007b:65f) points out, the scribal art changed from being a 
difficult skill to being an arcane art. Initially scribal education conferred social standing; 
later social standing was almost a prerequisite for scribal education. Scholarly works had to 
be kept from outsiders, suggesting that they were not that hard to master. Being unable to 
reproduce elitism in that form, we take our refuge in disciplinary totems and taboos, mainly 
linguistic ones. ‘Academic literacy’ is the current term for Carr’s ‘arcane writing system’. 
 
Those who cherish the other face of scribal culture will find Nietzsche an unreliable ally. 
He fulminates often against the barrenness of scholarship8 and the ponderous style of 
academic writing (GS 366). The ideal practitioner of the gay science moves on dancing feet 
and wields a hammer. Whereas the old scribe was enlisted to confirm and reproduce the old 
world and the old humanity, the new one has to create and destroy, to destroy in order to 
create. Nietzsche himself makes the distinction between those whose task (not an ignoble 
one) it is to make the past “übersichlich, überdenkbar, faszlich, handlich” the true 
philosophers who say “So soll es sein” in order to create the future”. “Ihr ‘Erkennen’ ist 
Schaffen” (BGE 211). 
 
But Nietzsche can be misunderstood here. He issues no licence for the production of 
knowledge by fiat. Real philosophers who are “Befehlende und Gesetzgeber”, must have 
acquired and mastered all that the mere pedants, their servants, have acquired (BGE 211). 
Nietzsche often criticizes scholars of his time for being too lax, too easily tempted by 
superficialities (D 190, 195). He might well have applauded the arduous Mesopotamian 
curriculum as a preliminary. Secondly, he outdoes practically everyone in his elitism9. Real 
ed for it (BGE 213) and must form a new caste. In this matter, as elsewhere, he rejects the 
notion of equality of rights with scorn. 
 
Nietzsche/Zarathustra is a curious teacher of wisdom. He appeals with great passion, 
but often says that that he does not want to be understood, at least not fully or by everyone. 
“Alles, was tief ist, liebt die Maske” (BGE 40; cf BGE 290). But as Hollingdale (1973:220) 
says:  “Either  you  seek  to  communicate  or  you  do  not.”  You  may  seek  to  frustrate 
communication, but that does not require a profound mind. Nietzsche’s claim that he wrote 
for a select few – and the status of the thousands who apply for the few vacancies – I leave to 
those who practice Nietzschean psychology. It suffices to say that Nietzsche too hid 
wisdom from the plebs behind a verbal curtain, albeit a remarkable richly embroidered one. 
 
Yet we may thank Nietzsche for opening our eyes at many points without closing them to 
what Nietzsche did not want to see. The second face is also still with us. Awakening the 
humanity in others and ourselves, opening our eyes and those of others to a world beyond 
our own limited experience, seeing how far our reason can take us towards wisdom: these 
are noble tasks. Even Nietzsche does not scorn the mere “workers in philosophy”, the 
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workhorses of wisdom (BGE 211). Being sick to death of everything subjective “und seiner 
verfluchten Ipsissimosität”, he has kind words for the objective spirit with which scholars 
seek, as best they can, to mirror the object of knowledge (BGE 207).10 If it enables us – 
together – to “confront the global situation with an attitude neither local nor imperialistic” 
(Burke 1945:442f), few occupations can be nobler than the scribal craft of today. 
 
For craft it is, as Nietzsche rightly saw: it may ennoble, but it does not make vornehm.11 We 
have other mechanisms in academia to cater for that striving. What they are and how much 
of our attention they occupy, I leave to my readers to ponder. Perhaps the second face of the 
scribe would be more visible if we were less vornehm and more noble – and vulgar. Yes, and 
a little less shy of the herd. 
 
Sumerian Today 
Do modern scribes have to write in ‘Sumerian’, a jargon accessible only to a small minority of 
initiates? Technical terminology can be defended on two scores: it serves precision and 
(often) brevity. Because folk names are hopelessly misleading, the scientific names for 
plants are useful to botanists – and ordinary gardeners. Wisdom, even practical wisdom, 
often requires precision. And when a single word or phrase carries with it an entire line of 
thought, insiders can dispense with much needless verbiage in speaking to other insiders. 
 
But technical terms are not invariably chosen for their acknowledged virtues. Academics 
and outsiders alike have long complained about the obscurity of much academic writing; 
some academics have long defended it. From Russell Jacoby’s depressing list of such 
defences (1994:164-173), some by well-known scholars, I give one example. Frederic 
Jameson speaks of ‘repressive clarity,’12 arguing that one does not expect  molecular 
biology, nuclear physics, linguistics or symbolic knowledge “to be laid out with all the 
leisurely elegance of the coffee table magazine”. Why should literary and cultural theory be 
less complex? Moreover, “clear and fluid journalistic writing” may serve a sinister 
ideological purpose, namely to ‘facilitate clichés’, perpetuate ‘cheap facility’ and avoid ‘real 
thinking’ (quoted in Jacoby 1994:167f). 
 
Brevity suffers equally. Ankersmit (1998:220) complains of the superfluous technicalities 
and obscure jargon in academic writing: “The argumentative nucleus and the length of 
postmodern  writings  are  often  inversely  proportional  to  each  other.”  Without  the 
‘superfluous technicalities’, the lengthy arguments can be justified. When one explains 
Kant’s  distinction  between  the  hypothetical  and  the  categorical  imperative  to  underity 
cannot be the first consideration. The jargon, in turn, is justified if it compresses the 
argument. 
 
In an interview13 Homi Bhabha shows how the verbiage employed can be entirely 
disproportionate to the sense conveyed. Roughly a page is devoted to saying that Western 
values, institutions and beliefs were not transplanted unchanged to India under the Raj. The 
time it took for orders to reach India and the different context of both those who had to 
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implement the orders and those on whom they were enforced subtly changed the 
implications of the orders. Moreover, the people involved, both colonizers and colonized, 
had to play dual roles, belong to two worlds at once. Quite. Where is the need to say that 
“the whole site of the colonial edict is continually split and doubled between origination 
and enunciation, temporally disjunct, in a way historically time-lagged” (1993:101)? (The 
whole sentence runs to eight lines of print.) 
 
The following sentence, a sin against both precision and brevity, deserves a paragraph of its 
own: “What I would like to do is at least indicate where other ‘genealogies’ of 
pragmatism can be constructed, for example where an other reading of Emerson can 
certainly be produced – one in which, say, the essay ‘Experience’ would be properly seen as 
announcing the foreclosure of that category (as the title ironically implies), the subject of 
‘experience’ him or herself dispossessed by the materiality of signs; or, for that matter, as if 
in a parody of all genealogies, go back to ‘father’ Protagoras, whose famous dictum on the 
metron – that is ‘Man is the measure of all things’ … and so on, often cited as a founding 
text (however contradictorily) of relativism, humanism and pragmatism – may be read as a 
performative text in which the category of ‘man (anthropos)’ is decentered, dismantled, and 
dissolved by a term, measure, which inscribes this non-subject in an activity of sheer 
semiosis and differencing not unlike, say, Peirce (Cohen: 1995:97).14 At least imagining 
Peirce as ‘an activity of sheer semiosis’ provides comic relief.” 
 
If the desire for precision and brevity does not explain the scribal addiction to jargon, what 
does? Certainly not a desire for stylistic elegance. Once mere literacy was not a secure 
barrier, ancient Mesopotamian scribes resorted to secrecy to keep their craft confined to 
insiders. Unable to copy them, modern scribes had to invent a new literacy, ‘academic 
literacy’, over which they could exercise control. As the Marxist critic Kananagh (in Girard 
1989:15)15 puts it: “A given theory becomes most adequate to its own consolidation and 
propagation when the resolutely arduous and paradoxical nature of its discourse serves to 
prolong and extend the progressively more self-enclosed and self-sustaining dialogue of 
master and disciple as an arcane science accessible only through diligent apprenticeship.” 
That is, scribes protect their turf. 
 
In our world very many people are far from uneducated. Outside the university there are 
many, with or without postgraduate qualifications, who read widely, think deeply and are 
well-informed about a range of subjects. These pundits pose a threat to professional ‘scribes’. 
To compensate for their lack in formal disciplinary background, pundits draw on their 
cross-disciplinary knowledge and their ability to explore angles neglected in ‘the 
literature’. Confronted by a super-pundit like Kenneth Burke16 (for instance), the scribal 
centre might not hold and mere anarchy might be loosed upon academia! Dread thought. 
 
Scribal Elitism 
Our precious (in both senses) ‘current discourses’ and obscurantist (yes) terminology 
protect a scribal elite. The heroes are the profound professionals, the villains the 
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congenitally stupid journalists.17 The crudeness and vulgarity of the elitism sometimes 
beggars description. Barbara Herrnstein Smith (quoted in Jacoby 1994:165) says that 
academic writing is “long on new, challenging ideas … conceptual, abstract, challenging, 
unfamiliar”. Journalists send  “vivid, dramatic and familiar  messages” confirming 
established ideas. In others she would surely have condemned such reckless 
generalizations.18 How I wish academic articles were long on new ideas, challenging or 
otherwise. 
 
Stanley Fish goes further than most in his defence of what he regards simply as 
professionalism. Professionalism “claims for itself  exclusive possession  of certain  skills” 
(1989:173): without such a claim, the profession’s work would be meaningless (172). From 
this it follows, quite logically, that the profession sets its own standards (174). On the basis of 
this, he rejects ‘blind submission’, because a paper with his name attached will, rightly in his 
view, be much more likely to be accepted. As someone who “has paid [his] dues”, he has 
“earned the benefit of the doubt”. This is self-interested but not selfish: it is driven by 
interests that “appear to me compelling given a sense of myself as a professional … with a 
stake in the future of the profession” (173). 
 
Fish, unlike some others, writes and argues well, but his plausible case is based on 
dubious assumptions. Most professions claim for themselves higher levels of skill in certain 
areas, not ‘exclusive possession’. Though I cannot match a professional chef, I cook fairly 
well and can enhance my skills without special professional training. Many professions set 
their own standards, but these are almost always co-determined by ‘consumers’ outside the 
profession. Professional standards in medicine would not survive unless they served those 
who need medical care. Outsiders may not know how to formulate the norms, but are the 
best judges of good and bad results. Literary criticism (Fish’s profession) should help 
outsiders, if only ultimately, with their reading of literature. Though Fish makes much of 
the political nature of professional decisions (1989:1972), it is the politics of the enclosed 
circle.19 
 
Scribal elites have historically been good at perpetuating themselves. Hamilton 
(1996:200-216) reviews the factors that stabilize the views of scholarly groups, often in the 
face of contradictory evidence. I list only some. Having acquired a particular theory 
(paradigm, method), scholars are eager to see how it works in a particular case, but not to 
examine the initial assumptions of the theory (201), which may be wrong or simply 
inapplicable in the particular case.20 Scholars develop a ‘trained attachment’ to certain 
viewpoints (201f). If I had to spend so much time and effort to learn ‘Sumerian’ (this 
jargon), it must be important. The effect is heightened if the attachment is seen as a moral 
one. Furthermore, contrary to their self-image, scholars are generally conformists, as 
experiments in social psychology have shown (202f). They seldom go against the 
consensus in the discipline (or subsection of it). 
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As a social scientist, Hamilton remains wedded to the notion of evidence. If this too is 
discarded, as it is in much ‘theory’, all the other factors continue to operate, but without the 
possibility of outside interference. Outsiders may criticize only if they have been inducted 
into the mysteries – the standards set by the profession – in which case they won’t criticize. 
But are these mysteries so deep and obscure? Hamilton (1996:11f) discusses an experiment 
conducted by social psychologists. A false ‘Dr Fox’ (actually an actor), with a fake CV, was 
asked to give a lecture on “mathematical game theory as applied to physical education” to 
highly-trained educators. The lecture was videotaped and played to other groups and 
three groups were asked to evaluate it. Though the content was nonsense, ‘Fox’, with a bit of 
coaching  in “double-talk, neologisms, non  sequiturs and  contradictory statements”, fooled 
everyone. One commented that the lecture was ‘too intellectual’; another reported having 
read some of Dr Fox’s publications. Nobody saw through the trick. 
 
Nietzsche’s elitism was quite different, if not less pernicious. The scribal elitists who 
quote him approvingly may find in him a deadly enemy. To write well is to think well and 
good writing must communicate, so that “alles Gute Gemeingut werden und den Freien 
alles freistehe”. Whoever disagrees “ist ein Feind der guten Europäer, ein Feind der freien 
Geister” (WS 87). “Den Stil verbessern – das heiszt den Gedanken verbessern” (WS 131). 
Nietzsche was (usually) a fine stylist, though he said it rather too often. His ten aphorisms 
on style (Zur Lehre vom Stil), written to Lou Salome (cf Andreas-Salome 1894:115f), make 
excellent sense. Writing should be lively and based on speech (with the written equivalent of 
gestures). Highly abstract ideas should be approached via the sensuous. Long periodic 
sentences should usually be avoided. 
 
He did believe his books were for a limited audience (EH Preface 3, III:1), but not for a 
professional circle of ‘gelehrte Hornvieh’ (EH III:1). For universities he generally had scant 
respect: outsiders were often quite right to despise them (SE 8). Though his fans honour 
him largely for demolishing all truth claims, it is not clear that he did that: Maudemarie 
Clark (1990) argues persuasively that, though he consistently rejects some conceptions of 
truth, Nietzsche in his later writings developed his own (not fully worked out) view of 
truth, which largely abandoned the ‘perspective metaphor’ (95-149). Other interpretations 
would render Nietzsche’s claims about truth “hopelessly confused and contradictory” (1).21 
At any rate, Nietzsche did not at any time tolerate sloppy writing or thinking. 
 
What would Wisdom say? 
Nietzsche wanted his philosophy to be one of experimentation (Versuch). He welcomed 
ideas to which he could reply “Versuchen wir’s!”(GS 51). I too wish to experiment with a 
rather wild idea. What if, instead of constantly trying to create (קנה) wisdom, we were to 
attempt to acquire (קנה) it? Shall we, by way of experiment, listen to wisdom as if it 
mattered to us and to others, instead of ‘researching’ it? Perhaps this Versuch will, as 
Nietzsche suggests, prove to be a Versuchung,22 but, since scribal culture is two-faced, we 
may be traitorously loyal to our scribal craft. The suggestions I offer below, without any 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
9 
 
attempt at completeness or finality and in most cases very briefly, constitute a Probe and a 
probe, not a proof. They do seem to hang together, but require much further thought. 
 
A Matter of Hearing 
The view that wisdom is primarily acquired, not innate, was widely shared in the ancient 
world. Confucius and Aristotle are at one in this. Receptivity of traditional lore precedes 
critical thinking and creativity. The latter follow later – if they follow at all. That the 
wisdom according to the Old Testament is based on  listening is  a commonplace (cf 
Crenshaw 1998:24). Wisdom can be glossed as “a listening heart”; Woman Wisdom 
requires first of all to be listened to (Prov 1:20-25; 8:1-6). Those qualities that are inimical to 
wisdom – pride (and being “wise in your own eyes”), excessive eagerness to speak, lack of 
self-discipline, uncontrolled emotions, drunkenness – all stand in the way of listening. 
 
Denise Ackermann (2014:183) records (on Michael Welker’ authority) what Gadamer said 
of Gerhard von Rad: “There was a silence in him that came out of deep listening.” 
Perhaps that is why he took the Israelite sages seriously as interlocutors, not only as 
“subjects of study”,23 and said of them that essentially they expounded one insight: 
“Constitutive for man’s humanity is the faculty of hearing” (1972:314). He respected their 
search for what truths are available. These truths, in his account, are by no means 
absolutely fixed: Each saying “had its truth only in a specific sphere in life and in a specific 
range of comparable circumstances” (311).24 At the same time, the “total receptivity to the 
truth” was not passivity, but “an intense activity” and a preparation for responding (297). 
 
This seems far removed from Nietzsche’s ideal of “the individual who freely shapes his 
own character and destiny” (Golomb 2017). When Chaim Perelman (1979:131) argues that 
any call for change which is not backed by good reasons is arbitrary and (potentially) 
unjust, the status quo seems to get the inner lane. But an uncritical call for change is 
arbitrary; a critical one assumes that the other side has been given a hearing. Walter (2017) 
warns against the “absurd dream of contemporary culture that we – anyone at all – just by 
‘being ourselves’ can surpass the ancient creativity of entire peoples”. Over many centuries a 
few ancient scribes produced a few creative masterpieces. Today we demand of every 
‘scribe’ to produce novelties on demand and at regular intervals. 
 
Moreover, Nietzsche did not advocate of random creativity; nor did he think it possible.25 
First, as Walter (2017) points out, his creative ideal was not for everyone. Even among 
scholars the majority are and should be mere hacks. Furthermore, to create oneself one has 
to learn the ‘laws’ operating in the world: “Wir müssen Physiker sein, um, in jener Sinne, 
Schöpfer sein zu können” (GS 335). In two very interesting sayings, he says that the one who 
seeks to determine the rule stands far higher than the one who seeks to determine the 
exception (AOM 362) and that the rule is far more interesting than the exception (D 442; 
cf BGE 26). This is a place to pause and think. 
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It cannot be said that modern scribes have not imbibed much: they know their lists. 
Whether they still listen is another matter, for listening implies giving heed to a voice that 
addresses us, the human voice we have so conveniently eliminated. Do we not pirate books 
that we have not read properly to garner our copious footnotes? If so, we are, in Nietzsche’s 
book, the worst kind of readers (AOM 137). 
 
Opening up 
To listen is to open yourself up, to make space for the other, even if the other is a dead 
author. While we might regard this as a done job, safely filed under “the otherness of the 
other” and “Derrida on hospitality”, we also persist in a habit of suspicion that selectively 
closes many cases before they have been heard.26 The other, fully theorized but hardly 
heard, is trotted out to act in the academic game of heroes and villains. But fine phrases do 
not solve the problem: when does openness become uncritical credulity and healthy 
scepticism the form of nihilism that Nietzsche deplored? 
 
Nietzsche offers an interesting saying that he probably intended as a useful rule of 
thumb. You should not be too suspicious of the idea of others in areas that are far removed 
from you, provided that you have close colleagues who are highly suspicious of your work 
(AOM 215). This, it seems, may be tweaked slightly to read: Be fairly open to what is far 
from your experience, ideology and knowledge, and highly suspicious of what which seems 
close to you. If our scribes heeded this, as they now seldom seem to do, they may 
distinguish between “the other of my theory” and “the other that upsets my theory”. 
 
It is a platitude that wisdom in Israel was part of an ‘international’ enterprise: Israel 
“participated in a phenomenon that enveloped the entire Fertile Crescent” (Crenshaw 
1998:229) in which it was “to a great extent a receiver and not a donor” (von Rad 1972:9). 
Israel’s openness to foreign material would not be remarkable were it not that exclusivism 
permeates large parts of the Old Testament. It is precisely here, and not everywhere, that 
biblical writers took their stance “among the nations”. Perhaps the space marked ‘wisdom’ 
where humanity stands undifferentiated is always a small and fragile one. Both those who 
champion inclusion (sometimes narrowly defined) and those who protect identities 
(sometimes without daring to say ‘exclusion’) have to reflect at this point27. The space is 
limited and not a seat of power, but it is where we can talk freely across boundaries28. 
 
Mastering Yourself 
Much has been written on the importance of self-discipline in wisdom writings and in 
Nietzsche, for whom Selbstüberwindung (also Selbstzucht) was always a crucial term. That 
both listening and openness to others (the two being closely connected) require self- 
discipline is evident. What is seldom noticed is the link between self-discipline and 
objectivity as a virtue. The ritual slaying of a notion of objectivity that practically nobody 
holds and that not many ever held is such a popular sport that other avenues remain 
unexplored, even unseen. 
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They did catch Nietzsche’s eye. His disdain for subjectivity and his regard for the use-value 
of objectivity were noted above. The true philosopher goes beyond objectivity, having 
first passed through it. The stage of receptivity, spreading yourself out to register every 
faintest movement (BGE 211), is a preparation for saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In comparing 
Nietzsche and Trump, Papazoglou (2016) notes that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is 
misunderstood if it is seen as a blanket validation of the individual’s view based solely on 
personal experience. Such a reading would indeed place Nietzsche on a par with Trump. 
 
But Nietzsche’s call is for many perspectives. Even the perverse perspectives spawned by the 
ascetic ideal help to discipline the mind on its way toward its “einstmaligen ‘Objektivität’”. 
Nietzsche uses the inverted commas to indicate that he does not mean “interesselose 
Anschauung”, which he rightly considers an absurdity. He does mean the ability to 
command different, sometimes contradictory, perspectives. “Je mehr Augen, verschiedne 
Augen wir uns für dieselbe Sache einzusetzen wissen, um so vollständiger wird unser 
‘Begriff’ dieser Sache, unsre ‘Objektivität’ sein.” (GM III:12).29 
 
Discipline is a bother, self-discipline doubly so. Nietzsche sometimes advocated 
recklessness – living dangerously (BGE 206, 224). Even more often he advocated the 
sternest self-discipline, simply because it is so annoyingly useful.30 It opens eyes. 
 
Public Speaking 
An Irish bull: To be open to others implies being open to others. What is the point of 
listening to others if your reply immediately excludes most of them? One of our 
administrators, an intelligent person but not a scribe, lamented that academics seem intent 
on restricting their audience. Academic apartheid’s sign reads: Members of the herd 
unwelcome. Woman Wisdom calls out in public places to a broad public. This does not 
mean that scribal wisdom was accessible to all in practice. Scribal education, being 
expensive, was mostly for the upper classes (and males). Moreover, ancient wisdom 
writings demanded a good bit of mental agility: on the lips of fools who do not understand 
their implications wise sayings are useless (Prov 26:7). As for those who think they 
understand Job perfectly… Nevertheless, these  considerations do  not cancel Woman 
Wisdom’s the selfunderstanding completely. She is in principle directing her call to 
everyone. It would be better if more had the benefit of her teaching and much better if fewer 
were fools. 
 
Therefore she resorts to charm, to a language that “combined logic with beauty” (Perdue 
2008:5). Having seen how non-elite audiences (some barely literate) react to the mere 
reading of Job 14, passages from Gilgamesh and scenes from Sophocles’s Antigone, I can 
attest that the magic still works. Though the aesthetic response does not confer 
understanding, it entices to understanding. The elegance of the presentation invites thought, 
for who would waste elegance on trifles? 
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The classic style as described by Thomas and Turner (1994) has as two of its ‘enabling 
conventions’ (31) the assumptions that the audience is not a narrow elite (49) and that the 
audience is competent (50-57). If the audience lacks certain specialized items of knowledge, it is 
by chance, for in principle they can acquire it just as the speaker did (54). The model is the 
“conversation between equals” (50). Using Foucault’s prose as an example, they show how style 
can create an asymmetrical relationship: the reader has to accept Foucault’s superior 
competence, but has no way of ever sharing it (55f). Though Thomas and Turner explicitly say 
that the classic style is not the only good style or the best style for all communicative contexts 
(72-108), one could argue that scribes would do well to adopt it. 
 
Mostly they don’t. They generally offer two weirdly contradictory reasons for choosing a style 
that implies an elite audience and an asymmetrical relationship between writer and reader. 
On the one hand, scholars “who have gone through graduate training” are professionals, 
trained in the language of the profession: outsiders should not expect to understand them 
(Frank, quoted in Jacoby 1994:167). On the other hand, their linguistic contortions are 
supposed to destabilize (interrupt, subvert) ordinary patterns of thought so as to enable 
new insights (cf Lasch 1995:178). But if only those trained in the profession and writing in 
the same jargon can understand them, whose thoughts can be destabilized? If laughter 
destabilizes thought, ‘covfefe’ has radically destabilized mine. 
 
Can Lloyd Chetty, our administrator, hear you? Do you want Lloyd Chetty to hear you? If not, 
why not? If you are addressing Nietzsche’s higher people, please call elitism by its name. 
 
The Fear of Yahweh 
If יהוה יראת means merely “trust in and reverence for God” (Perdue 2008:6), one could 
conclude that in Israel, perhaps at a late stage, wisdom was made entirely dependent on a 
specific religious faith. This would contradict much of the openness displayed the (earlier?) 
wisdom literature. This glossing of the term also neutralizes the word ‘fear’. In both 
respects, however, this reading, if adopted simplistically, may be misleading. 
 
Wisdom For any limited being wisdom begins with a recognition of limitations. As noted 
above, even Nietzsche knew that we can create only within limits. This recognition not only 
excludes unrealistic (and therefore unwise) aspirations; it also indicates along which lines 
one could expect positive results. If there is some ultimate power of any sort before which 
all must inevitably bow, it is wise to have this power on one’s side, to cooperate with it. 
In the faith that Yahweh is this ultimate power, Israel coined the saying that the fear of 
Yahweh is the beginning of wisdom without thereby denying that there are other powers 
and that some wisdom flows from ‘fearing’ them. One can get a long way by cooperating 
with the king! 
 
If any power is worthy of trust and respect, the element of awe (Ehrfurcht) cannot be 
excluded completely. Grandly put, the Holy is also the mysterium tremendum; mundanely 
put, we seek wisdom because folly gets us into trouble. For me most thinking beyond the 
routine starts with blind panic (and ends when the panic disappears). Nietzsche, who 
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recognized no God and few (if any) equals, did not want fear to disappear ((BGE 201, 226; 
GM III:14). In the chaotic world that he saw, there was still the Rangordnung: there had to 
be, else nothing would make any sense.31 The ‘last man’ (Z prologue 5), who invented 
happiness, banished fear and made all things small, perhaps refers to those who deconstruct 
hierarchies in the sky and life in cosy, closed coteries on earth.32 
 
Academic discourse is often awful and often thinks itself awesome, but there is little of awe 
in it. Should there be? Here I am a poor guide. Where are you going to begin your 
thinking? What is the ראשית of your wisdom? 
 
Scribes that Open Eyes; Scribes with Open Eyes 
Things fall apart as they did in Yeats’s time and often before: some will say with Nietzsche: 
“Der kleine Mensch kehrt ewig wieder” (Z III:13). But is the person who returns petty or 
merely a פתי? To instruct פתאים in whatever wisdom they have is one of the tasks of scribes. If 
we leave them no wiser, we may at least leave them better informed33, with eyes that may see 
further than ours. This is no time for lamenting fogies or even self-lacerating ones. 
Perhaps we have messed up, we scribes, but perhaps we have simply overestimated our 
influence vastly. It is possible that our influence could in future be greater (albeit very 
indirect) if we opened our eyes to the humanity we have theoretically abolished and saw in 
this humanity eyes to be opened. That is, if we showed the second face of the scribe rather 
than the first. 
 
I have “written my tablet” with (I hope) sufficient ‘Sumerian’ and list wisdom. What does 
that prove? That I have read all my sources? Think again. Perhaps that I have read 
Nietzsche slightly more thoroughly than some who quote him, which does not prove that I 
understand him. If, amid all the posturing, I have indicated that I care for wisdom and the 
second face of the scribe, the one that humanizes and opens the eyes, and have directed a 
few  gazes  in  that  direction,  it  has  been  worth  the  effort. I present this with deep 
appreciation to Hendrik Bosman, a scribe with open eyes who opened eyes. 
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Endnotes 
1         Here is a selection: Stanley Fish (2016), Drucilla Cornell and Stephen Seely (2016), 
Alexis Papazoglou   (2016), Eric Walter (2017), Richard Schacht (2016), Jacob Golomb 
(2017). The last four are philosophers, the last two eminent Nietzsche scholars. Earlier, 
another Nietzsche scholar, Brian Leiter (2014), defended Nietzsche against the charge of 
fascism – again. He quotes, predictably, BGE 251 to show Nietzsche’s high regard for Jews, 
neglecting to add BGE 195 and GM I:7 (highly critical). Quoting Nietzsche can be like proof- 
texting! Crane Brinton (1940) had already, at a crucial time, listed the many ambiguous (if not 
outright contradictory) strands in Nietzsche that bear on fascism. More recently Alexander 
Nehemas has accused Nietzsche scholars of skirting the issue of Nietzsche's attitude to the 
‘evil hero’, whom he calls ‘Hitler’ (to distinguish him from the singular figure) (1999:1). He 
concludes that ‘Hitler’ does conform to Nietzsche’s criteria for nobility (15). Nietzsche’s 
philosophy “refuses to reject the evil hero unconditionally”, but this is because of Nietzsche’s 
complete rejection of morality, which is itself a form of the dogmatism Nietzsche rejected 
(16). If Nietzsche’s own view had a moral basis (14f), we may affirm Nietzsche while rejecting  
certain of his conclusions (15). 
2         Why is wisdom personified as a woman in a patriarchal culture? The common view that 
Woman Wisdom is a distant shadow of a goddess of wisdom does not answer this question. 
Probably Perdue (2008:7) is right to see in her “an intellectual eros or the alluring 
incarnation of divine Wisdom … an entrancing and intelligent  woman teacher”. In short, the 
(male) sages saw wisdom as a woman because wisdom is desirable. 
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3         But not never. See Harris (1990) on female scribes and sages in Mesopotamia and 
Egypt, and Camp (1990) and Brenner (1993) on them in Israel. Did these women, being a 
small minority, share the scribal ethos? 
4         Though, as Sneed (2011:62f) points out, scribes necessarily had a hand in all biblical 
texts. 
5         See Beaulieu (2007:10-17) for part of this convoluted history. 
6         Mark Sneed has questioned the assumption that Israelite scribes all belonged to the 
upper class, pointing out that the class analysis is shaky (see Sneed 1994). He pointedly refers 
to academics to indicate that (social) status does not imply economic or political power (658). 
Elsewhere (Sneed 2011:61f) he quotes Saldarini’s view that the word ‘scribe’ could refer to 
roles ranging from (in modern terms) “typist to cabinet officer” 
7         See Harris (1989:5f) for the early use of these terms, which soon meant both “unable to 
read and write” and “lacking in culture”. 
8         While modifying the nationalism of his early lectures Über die Zukunft unserer 
Bildungsanstalten, his attitude remained unchanged (cf TI VII:5-7). Scholars are not higher 
people and by instinct follow the herd (GS 373). 
9         Nietzsche is often ‘appropriated’ without mention of his elitism. Bamford (2007), 
searching for links between Nietzsche and Ubuntu, uses mainly one enigmatic passage from 
Zarathustra and concepts such as ‘authenticity’ that Nietzsche himself never uses – no word 
about elitism or “Jede Gemeinschaft macht … ‘gemein’” (BGE 284; cf GM III:18). Berry 
(2015) is far more plausible when she says that we should assume that Nietzsche means what 
he says (often and clearly) and “not to supply him with theories that he himself does not 
attempt to develop” (283f). As she adds, this does not mean always taking him literally. 
10       Obviously this is not fully possible; but Nietzsche tacitly admits that it is not fully 
impossible either. The scholar who works in this way is like extremely precious instruments, 
but belongs “in the hand of one who is mightier” (BGE 211). Could some of our students be 
among the mightier ones? 
11       English translations usually use ‘noble’ where Nietzsche has ‘vornehm’. Nietzsche’s 
obsession with being 
vornehm grated even his friends Rohde and Overbeck. For their comments on it, see 
Ginzburg (1999:28f). 
12       Sande Cohen (quoted in Jacoby 1994:171) says that clarity leads to ‘intellectual evasion’: 
academic writing must “refuse to convince a reader by its cadence or even rightness”. “An 
emerging body of literature  addresses the politics and ethics of accessibility and questions 
the demand for a not so innocent clear speech that is often powerfully overcoded and leveled 
to a violent and deadening transparency” (St Pierre 1996). Just as, in the 1930s, a substantial 
body of literature addressed the “not so innocent presence of Jews in Europe”? Patti Lather 
(1996) quotes Deborah Britzman’s hope that “educational research will become unintelligible 
to itself” and adds: “Britzman’s statement situates unintelligibility as an ethical imperative 
and political intervention in terms of disrupting the ways we make sense.” 
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13       Even those whose writings are impenetrable are usually lucid in interviews – perhaps to 
their disadvantage! 
14       The long footnote to this sentence (on the same page) is, if anything, even more obscure 
– or absurd. 
15       For similar pronouncements, see Girard (1989:238ff); Graff (1989:257). 
16       Burke held no degrees. Nietzsche, though he was a professor for a while, was essentially 
a pundit. 
17       Herrnstein Smith (quoted in Atlas 1990:17) speaks of “cross-citing and mutually puffing 
… articles” – 
referring to journalists. Not to academics? 
18       For instance, in Battle of the Books (1990), James Atlas, a journalist, surveys the 
American academic scene (Humanities) in a well-informed and balanced way. He deplores 
the jargon, insularity and self-praise of some academics, but he is also suspicious of 
journalists “who put down academics” and of academic critics of academia with an axe to 
grind (79). 
19       This may not worry Fish. In the same volume (1989:342-355) he argues, against the 
popular academic view, that ‘anti-foundationalist’ theory has no practical impact: “practice 
has nothing to do with theory” (355). This he has repeated recently (Fish 2017): postmodern 
theory advocates no course of action. In spite of theory, “at any given time we always know 
what is right and wrong, true and false”, but only as a particular perspective, one with no 
special validity. We have to live with this battlefield of “different and opposing facts”. Trump? 
20       An example of biblical scholarship: Just as allegorical interpretation should be used for 
allegories, not other texts, redactional criticism should be used for edited texts. The 
assumption that all biblical texts have undergone a process of redaction (to the same extent) 
should at least be examined. 
21       Clark (1990:63-93) argues that Nietzsche’s position is contradictory in Über Wahrheit 
und Lüge im aussermoralische Sinne (from which his followers love to quote but that 
Nietzsche himself did not publish), but that Nietzsche saw the problem and abandoned his 
earlier position (though there are traces even in the “middle period”). Leiter (2015) says the 
view of Nietzsche as “a global anti-realist” who rejects all truth claims has now “been widely 
discredited”. 
22       See the play on the various meanings of Versuch and Versuchung in BGE 42. 
23       See his remarks on modern exegetes who try to neutralize the tension between their 
own view of reality and that of the sages “by means of some sort of criticism”, without ever 
subjecting their own views to critical scrutiny (von Rad 1972:301). In brief, they analyse the 
texts without listening to them. 
24       Compare also: “Experience … teaches that you can never be certain. You must always 
remain open to new experiences” (1972:106); “[T]he sense of a sentence was never 
completely fixed; any attempt to understand it was always a flexible one” (33). What is 
discovered includes contradictions (199), for “All truth is inscrutable; only to the uncritical 
man does it appear … clear and unequivocal” (297). Is this very far from          Nietzsche? 
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25       On this, see Leiter (2015), arguing against, for instance, Schacht’s view. 
26 When an article announces that it intends to ‘interrogate’ X, we may be sure that at the 
close X will come forward, somewhat worse for wear, to confess its crimes at the show trial. 
Have some academics stopped listening to themselves? 
27       Lash (1995:17) notes how the slogan ‘diversity’ has come to mean its opposite, since 
“rival minorities take shelter behind a set of beliefs impervious to rational discussion”, each 
barricaded behind “its own dogma”. 
28       “Civic life requires settings in which people meet as equals, without regard to race, class 
or national origin” 
(Lasch 1995:117). 
29       For a good account of Nietzsche’s view on objectivity, see Appel (1996). 
30       Thus, while rejecting the ascetic ideal, he advocates a version of it for philosophers (GM 
III:8, 9). 
31       Here I interpret. Though Nietzsche was an atheist and had been disappointed in his 
heroes Wagner and Schopenhauer, he could not imagine a life in which reverence played no 
role (cf BGE 263). Hence his insistence on the order of rank and on “the pathos of distance” 
(BGE 257; GM I:2, III:18), a phrase that deserves attention. Pure equality abolished that 
except if there is a God (cf BGE 219). The pathos of distance is the gap left by the absence of 
God. 
32       In a general critique of the postmodern use of Nietzsche that focuses particularly on the 
issue of the subject, Gemes (2001:357) concludes that the decentred subject of postmodernity 
corresponds to Nietzsche’s last man, not to the overman. 
33       When a judge told FE Smith that his long explanation “leaves me [the judge] none the 
wiser”, Smith replied: “I know, your honour, but it does leave you better informed.” 
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